



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STAFF NOTES:

Soviet Union Eastern Europe

State Department review completed

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C O N T E N T S

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Soviet Commentary on the
Defeat of Japan

The Soviet treatment of the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II in East Asia not surprisingly plays down the role of the West and exaggerates the role of the USSR in the defeat of Japan. Defense Minister Grechko's order of the day says flatly that the Soviet contribution was decisive. Grechko acknowledges the contribution of the "allies and Asian national liberation movements," but only Mongolia is specifically mentioned.

Another major theme is the importance of Japan's defeat for the national liberation movement in Asia, particularly in Korea and China. A *Pravda* article that was apparently written by the chief of the Foreign Ministry's First Asian Division, Mikhail Kapitsa, reiterates the long-standing Soviet claim that the USSR delivered Manchuria to the Chinese Communists and that the arms the Soviets turned over to the Chinese were instrumental in the Communist victory in 1949.

Other Soviet propaganda on the anniversary has gone even further in stressing the contribution of the Soviets to the Chinese Communist victory. A *Red Star* article on August 26 spells out the number of arms turned over to the Chinese after the Soviets occupied Manchuria and attacks Mao for trying to minimize the significance of this aid. Another article in *Literary Gazette* on September 3 implies the USSR provided "massive help" to the Communists throughout the course of the civil war. The Soviets did provide some aid to the Chinese Communists, but it was not massive, and Moscow continued to deal with the Nationalists almost to the eve of the Communist victory in 1949.

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In Grechko's order, he expresses satisfaction that Moscow's relations with Japan are developing in a spirit of "good neighborliness." The Kapitsa article, however, suggests otherwise. It treats Moscow's territorial dispute with Japan in such a way as to imply that Moscow will never compromise, and it attacks "certain circles" in Japan for impeding progress toward better Soviet-Japanese relations. The article's toughness toward the Japanese may stem in part from anxiety that Japan will agree to include an anti-hegemony clause in its proposed peace treaty with China. The Soviets clearly regard conclusion of such a treaty as a significant setback to their interests in Asia.

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Poles Clarify Position on
Schmidt-Gierek Agreements

Foreign Minister Olszowski has reassured the West German ambassador in Warsaw that there are no differences in interpretation of the Gierek-Schmidt accords reached last month at Helsinki. [REDACTED]

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Olszowski maintained that the 120,000 ethnic Germans allowed to emigrate will be destined for the Federal Republic, not East Germany or any other country. In addition, Warsaw does not intend to redefine any provisions of the accords. When questioned about Polish press commentaries that had caused West German concern, Olszowski claimed that they were based on misinterpretations. He said he had been on vacation and thus had not been able to explain the agreements to important journalists.

Although this explanation is plausible, we cannot exclude the possibility that Warsaw floated the reinterpretations to test West German reactions on the emigration issue, and then backed down in the face of Bonn's growing concern. In any case, we do not expect Warsaw to pose more difficulties on the accords, at least for the next several months.

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